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Who Rates Prospective Federal Judges 
for the American Bar Association? 
Michael J. Yelnosky* 
ABSTRACT 
 
The American Bar Association plays a formal, unique, and 
consequential role in the selection of federal judges. More 
specifically, the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary, a group of fifteen lawyers appointed by the president of 
the ABA, rates all potential nominees for federal judicial 
appointments.  The work of the Standing Committee has been a 
subject of some study and public debate, but the professional 
orientation of the members of the committee has been largely 
ignored. 
My research shows that lawyers who represent business 
interests in state and federal courts are vastly overrepresented on 
the committee, and that most of those lawyers practice in this 
country’s largest law firms.  This imbalance is inconsistent with 
any legitimate justification for the ABA’s special role in judicial 
selection and is contradicted by the ABA’s public statements about 
the composition of the committee.  Unless the ABA commits to 
reform its process so that a more representative swath of the 
profession evaluates prospective federal judges, it should not retain 
its privileged status. 
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I. THE ROLE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING 
COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
To the uninitiated, the role that the American Bar Association 
(“ABA”) plays in the selection of federal judges may come as a 
surprise. Of course, no constitutional or statutory provision 
contemplates ABA involvement  in the selection process.  After, 
all, the ABA is simply a voluntary professional organization,1 and 
only approximately one-third of the licensed lawyers in the United 
States are members.2 
Indeed, for decades after it was founded in 1878, the ABA had 
no special role in the selection of federal judges.  That changed in 
1952, when the Eisenhower administration solicited the views of 
the ABA on judicial nominees, reportedly in an attempt to reduce 
the likelihood that senators could successfully push for the 
nomination of unqualified political cronies.3  Since then, with few 
exceptions, the ABA has issued a ranking for each potential 
 
*Professor, Roger Williams University School of Law.  Thanks to Meghan 
Kruger for her superb research assistance.  Thanks also to all who gave me 
helpful comments on my drafts.  An op-ed presenting some of the findings of 
this study previously appeared in the Washington Post.  See Michael J. 
Yelnosky, The Bar Association Panel Should Diversify Its Representation, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-bar-
association-panel-should-diversify-its-representation/2013/08/15/b79c5a18-
045f-11e3-88d6-d579fab4637_story.html.  
 1.  About the American Bar Association, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.americanbar.org/utility/about_the_aba.html (last visited Sept. 17, 
2013). 
 2.   The association has approximately 400,000 members.  Id.  The ABA 
reported that in 2012 there were 1,268,011 licensed lawyers in the United 
States. ABA Market Research Department, Lawyer Demographics, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION (2012), available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/PublicDocuments/ 
lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Lawyer 
Demographics].    
 3.   See Laura E. Little, The ABA’s Role In Prescreening Federal Judicial 
Candidates: Are We Ready To Give Up On The Lawyers?, 10 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 37, 39–40 (2001); Blake Tartt, The Participation of the Organized 
Bar in Judicial Selection: What is Proper, and What is Improper, 43 S. TEX. L. 
REV. 125, 138 (2001).  Other accounts of the history note that in 1946 the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, which was controlled by Republicans, invited 
the ABA to vet judicial candidates to stem the tide of “leftist” Democratic 
appointees.  See Susan Navarro Smelcer et al., Bias and the Bar: Evaluating 
the ABA Ratings of Federal Judicial Nominees, 65 POL. RES. Q. 827, 827 n.2 
(2012).  
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nominee for a federal judicial vacancy.4  The ratings are the work 
product of the ABA’s Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary.  The committee has fifteen members appointed by the 
ABA president—two from the Ninth Circuit, one from each of the 
other federal judicial circuits, and a committee chair.5 The 
members of the committee serve staggered three-year terms.6  A 
short description of the committee’s evaluation process will help 
put my findings in context. 
Prior to a nomination to one of the lower federal courts,7 the 
White House or the Department of Justice sends the Standing 
Committee chair the name of a prospective nominee.8  The chair 
assigns the evaluation to the committee member from the judicial 
circuit where the vacancy exists.9  The member examines the 
questionnaire submitted by the prospective nominee, reviews the 
writings of the prospective nominee, and investigates any 
disciplinary actions or proceedings involving the prospective 
nominee.10  Most of the member’s time is spent on confidential 
interviews with judges, lawyers, and others to obtain their 
 
 4.   American Bar Association, Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary: What it is and How it Works 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/scfedjud/federal_judic
iary09.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter Standing Committee]. President 
George W. Bush did not consult the ABA until after he made a formal 
nomination to fill a vacancy, but President Obama is following the prior 
practice of seeking ABA feedback on potential nominees.  See e.g., Maya Sen, 
How Judicial Qualification Ratings Matter (and Why They Maybe Shouldn’t) 
4–6 (June 30, 2013) (working paper), available at http://scholar. 
harvard.edu/files/msen/files/sen_ratings.pdf.  Politicians of both parties have, 
at various times, both praised and criticized the ABA’s involvement.  See e.g., 
James Sieja, Bias, the Bar, and the Big Picture: Evaluating Circuit Court 
Nominees’ ABA Ratings from 1953 to 2011 12 (Aug. 30, 2012) (working paper) 
(on file with University of Wisconsin, Madison, Department of Political 
Science). 
 5.    Standing Committee, supra note 4. 
 6.   Id.  Approximately one-third of the committee turns over each year.  
No member may serve more than two terms.  Id.   
 7.   As mentioned above, President George W. Bush did not inform the 
Standing Committee until the President had named a nominee.  The 
committee’s procedures are different in the case of vacancies on the Supreme 
Court. See Standing Committee, supra note 4, at 9–10.  Supreme Court 
appointments are not a particular focus of this paper.       
 8.   Id. at 4.  
 9.   Id. 
 10.   Id.  
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assessments of the prospective nominee’s integrity, professional 
competence, and judicial temperament.  The member will conduct 
a personal interview of the prospective nominee after most or all 
of the interviews with lawyers, judges, and community 
members.11  The member then prepares an informal report for 
review by the chair.12 
The report contains the member’s evaluation of the 
prospective nominee’s “integrity, professional competence and 
judicial temperament,” the criteria upon which the committee’s 
ultimate ratings are based.13  A prospective nominee may be rated 
“Well Qualified, Qualified, [or] Not Qualified.”14 
To merit a rating of “Well Qualified,” the prospective nominee 
must be at the top of the legal profession in his or her legal 
community; have outstanding legal ability, breadth of experience, 
and the highest reputation for integrity; and demonstrate the 
capacity for sound judicial temperament.  The rating of ‘Qualified’ 
means that the prospective nominee satisfies the Committee’s 
very high standards with respect to integrity, professional 
competence and judicial temperament, and that the Committee 
believes that the prospective nominee is qualified to perform 
satisfactorily all of the duties and responsibilities required of a 
federal judge. When a prospective nominee is found ‘Not 
Qualified,’ the Committee has determined that the prospective 
nominee does not meet the Committee’s standards with respect to 
one or more of its evaluation criteria—integrity, professional 
 
 11.    Id.  
 12.   Id. at 4–5. 
 13.   Id. at 3.  The Committee’s written guidelines describe these 
obviously subjective criteria as follows:   
 
When the Committee evaluates “integrity,” it considers the 
prospective nominee’s character and general reputation in 
the legal community, as well as the prospective nominee’s 
industry and diligence. “Professional competence” 
encompasses such qualities as intellectual capacity, 
judgment, writing and analytical abilities, knowledge of the 
law, and breadth of professional experience. In evaluating 
“judicial temperament,” the Committee considers the 
prospective nominee’s compassion, decisiveness, open-
mindedness, courtesy, patience, freedom from bias, and 
commitment to equal justice under the law.  
     Id.  
 14.   Id. at 6.  
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competence or judicial temperament.15 
After reviewing the informal report with its author, the chair 
notifies the White House of the likely ultimate rating.16  If the 
White House opts to proceed with the prospective nominee, the 
chair directs the member to prepare a formal report for review by 
the full committee.17  Each member, with the exception of the 
chair (unless there is a tie vote), then votes on a rating, and the 
ultimate rating is communicated to the White House.18  The 
Committee releases the rating to the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
the Department of Justice, and the public only if the president 
submits a nomination.19 
The Committee’s ratings are quite consequential.  A recent 
study by Maya Sen concludes that high ABA ratings are one of the 
most predictive factors in determining confirmation success, with 
low-rated individuals significantly more likely to have their 
nominations ultimately withdrawn or rejected.20  Her study 
looked at the experience of almost two thousand judges formally 
nominated to the federal district courts between 1960 and 2012.  
Those who received a “Not Qualified” rating from the Committee 
were over one-third less likely to succeed than those who received 
a “Qualified” or “Well Qualified” rating.21  However, Sen’s findings 
likely understate the negative impact of a low ABA rating because 
there is no data available on how often  presidents decided not to 
formally nominate prospective candidates who received a low 
rating from the committee.22 
 
 15.   Id.  
 16.   However, if the member intends to rate the prospective nominee 
“Not Qualified,” after informing the White House the chair will appoint a 
second evaluator and both formal reports are sent to committee members 
before they vote on a rating.  Id. at 6–7. 
 17.  Id. at 6.  
 18.   Id.  If the committee is not unanimous, the chair reports that the 
prospective nominee received the rating from a majority (eight to nine 
members) or substantial majority (ten to thirteen members) of the Committee 
and notes that a minority gave the prospective nominee another rating or 
ratings. Id. 
 19.   Id. at 3.       
 20.   Sen, supra note 4, at 14–15.  
 21.   Id. at 15–16.  Moreover, those who received a “Qualified” rating were 
5.5% less likely to succeed than those who received a “Well Qualified” rating.  
Id. at 14–15.      
 22.   Id. at 5.       
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Given the significant influence of the committee on the 
composition of the federal judiciary, I wanted to find out more 
about its members.  In particular, based on a cursory review of the 
professional backgrounds of the members of the committee for 
2012-2013, I wanted to see if lawyers who represented business 
interests were overrepresented on the committee.  If so, the 
justification for giving the ABA a special role in federal judicial 
selection might be seriously undermined. 
II. THE MEMBERS OF THE ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY 
To answer this question, I identified the eighty-eight 
individuals who served as circuit representatives or chairs of the 
committee between 1999 and 2013.23  I then researched the 
members’ backgrounds and determined where each was working 
while on the committee and the nature of his or her law practice 
(the overwhelming majority of members were practicing lawyers 
while on the committee).  The resulting dataset includes the name 
of the member’s law firm (or other institution), the nature of the 
member’s practice (for example, “represents businesses in 
litigation,” or “represents individuals in divorce and other family 
law cases”), and the number of lawyers at the member’s law firm.  
I calculated the number of members in certain practice categories 
and settings and compared the results to available information 
about the  profession as a whole.24  This information permitted me 
to draw some conclusions about whether the members were 
representative of the practicing bar. 
I found that seventy-five of the committee members (85.2%) 
served on the committee while exclusively or predominantly 
representing corporations or other business entities.  Moreover, 
fifty-four of the committee members (61.3%) were representing 
business interests while members of the largest law firms in the 
 
  23.   New committee members are named at the ABA annual meetings in 
August, so the composition of a committee remains unchanged for one year 
beginning and ending in August.  Thus, the study covers fifteen separate 
committees, beginning with the committee that considered candidates 
between August 1999 and August 2000 and ending with the committee that 
will consider candidates between August 2013 and August 2014.   
 24.  The data describing the legal profession as a whole was gathered 
from the 2012 ABA report of lawyer demographics. See Lawyer 
Demographics, supra note 2.    
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country—law firms of over 100 lawyers.25  By contrast, the ABA 
reports that 16% of all private practice lawyers in the U.S. work in 
firms of that size.26  Another four committee members represented 
businesses in law firms of between fifty and one hundred lawyers.  
Thus, fifty-eight of the committee members (65.9%) were 
representing business interests while members of law firms of 
over fifty lawyers.  By contrast, only 20% of all private practice 
lawyers in the U.S. work in firms of that size.27 
Only thirteen of the eighty-eight lawyers on the committee 
(14.7%) did not regularly represent businesses in their law 
practices.  Of those thirteen, seven mostly represented individuals 
(such as in divorce or professional malpractice cases), one was a 
neutral arbitrator and mediator, and only five (5.6% of the total 
members of the committee) had practices in which they regularly 
represented individuals as plaintiffs in litigation against 
businesses.28  Furthermore, not one represented defendants in 
non-white-collar criminal cases.  The findings described in the last 
two paragraphs are summarized in Table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 25.   The 100-lawyer marker I selected was somewhat arbitrary, but it 
was influenced by the content of the latest ABA study of the legal profession, 
which lists firms of “101+ lawyers” as the largest firms in the country.  See 
Lawyer Demographics, supra note 2.  Moreover, many worked for the very 
largest law firms in the country—firms such as Bryan Cave; Proskauer Rose; 
Dechert; Covington & Burling; Greenberg Traurig; K&L Gates; Baker 
Hostetler; Holland & Knight; Hunton & Williams; WilmerHale; Debevoise; 
Bingham McCutcheon; Vinson & Elkins; and McGuire Woods, to name a few.  
  26.   Id.   
  27.   Id.  The plurality of lawyers in private practice are solo practitioners 
(49%).  Id.  Fourteen percent work in firms of two to five lawyers, 6% work in 
firms of six to ten lawyers, 6% work in firms of eleven to twenty, and another 
6% work in firms of twenty-one to fifty lawyers.  Id.  Thus, the overwhelming 
majority (80%), practice in smaller firms than the majority of private practice 
lawyers on the standing committee.     
  28.   We took care here to code liberally in favor of finding a plaintiffs’ 
practice in order to not overstate the corporate or business slant of the 
members of the Standing Committee.  
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TABLE 1 
 
 
This same dramatic tilt in favor of lawyers representing 
businesses in litigation is found by looking instead at the 
composition of the fifteen individual committees that were formed 
over the studied time period.  Each committee had a majority of 
members that represented businesses.  In every year it was a 
supermajority.  For example, in 2006–2007, ten of the fifteen 
members represented businesses (66.67%). On every other 
committee, the percentage was much higher, ranging from 73.33% 
(eleven members) to 93.33% (fourteen members).  Table 2 displays 
the results for each committee studied. 
 
TABLE 2 
 
Standing Committee Members 1993-2013 88 100% 
Lawyers Representing Businesses 75 85.23% 
Lawyers Representing Businesses 100+ Lawyers 54 61.36% 
Lawyers Representing Businesses 50+ Lawyers 58 65.91% 
Lawyers Not Representing Businesses 13 14.77% 
Lawyers Representing Individuals as Plaintiffs Against Businesses 5 5.68% 
% of members representing business 
1999-2000 Committee 93.33% 
2000-2001 Committee 93.33% 
2001-2002 Committee 93.33% 
2002-2003 Committee 86.67% 
2003-2004 Committee 86.67% 
2004-2005 Committee 86.67% 
2005-2006 Committee 73.33% 
2006-2007 Committee 66.67% 
2007-2008 Committee 80.00% 
2008-2009 Committee 86.67% 
2009-2010 Committee 93.33% 
2010-2011 Committee 80.00% 
2011-2012 Committee 80.00% 
2012-2013 Committee 80.00% 
2013-2014 Committee 93.33% 
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Finally, recall that the primary responsibility for evaluating a 
prospective judicial nominee is assigned to the member from the 
judicial circuit where the vacancy exists.  Thus, the type of 
practice of the committee members in each circuit is another 
relevant measure of the type of lawyers the ABA has selected to  
influence the judicial selection process.  Not surprisingly, given 
that the overwhelming majority of committee members 
represented businesses in their practices, potential nominees for 
vacancies in virtually every circuit were likely to be primarily 
evaluated by a lawyer who represented businesses.  Specifically, 
in seven of the thirteen circuits, each committee member during 
the last fifteen years was a lawyer who represented businesses.  
Moreover, in only two circuits, the First (50%) and the Ninth 
(58%), was the percentage of members who represented business 
interests  less than 80% during the study period.  The results are 
set forth in Table 3. 
TABLE 3 
 
 Thus, lawyers who represent businesses and those who do so 
as members of the largest law firms in the United States have, by 
virtually any measure, outsized influence over the ABA ratings of 
prospective judicial nominees.  While others have noted more 
generally that the ABA membership and leadership is not 
Committee Members Representing Businesses: 1999-2013 
First Circuit 50% 
Second Circuit 83% 
Third Circuit 86% 
Fourth Circuit 100% 
Fifth Circuit 100% 
Sixth Circuit 100% 
Seventh Circuit 100% 
Eighth Circuit 83% 
Ninth Circuit 58% 
Tenth Circuit 100% 
Eleventh Circuit 100% 
D.C. Circuit 80% 
Federal Circuit 100% 
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representative of the profession as a whole,29 the results of this 
study confirm and quantify that mismatch in the influential area 
of federal judicial selection.  I turn now to a brief discussion of the 
ramifications of these findings. 
III.  WHY SHOULD BIG FIRM LAWYERS WHO REPRESENT BUSINESS 
INTERESTS HAVE OUTSIZED INFLUENCE IN RATING PROSPECTIVE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL NOMINEES? 
Of course, lawyers who represent business interests and those 
who do so as members of large law firms are not a monolithic 
group.  For example, there is no doubt that political, ideological, 
and geographical diversity exists among the members of the 
Standing Committee.  Some big firm lawyers do pro bono work, 
and some do not.  Some are active in community organizations, 
and some are not.  However, the dramatic overrepresentation on 
the Standing Committee of lawyers who make their livings 
representing some of the world’s largest corporations in  large law 
firms raises serious questions about the way in which the ABA 
has chosen to exercise its unique power of evaluating prospective 
judicial nominees. 
First, that overrepresentation is inconsistent with the 
strongest (although not necessarily convincing) argument in favor 
of formal ABA participation in the process of selecting federal 
judges. The argument has three parts: (1) an “independent” 
evaluation of judicial candidates is valuable, (2) lawyers have the 
knowledge and skill necessary to effectively evaluate judicial 
candidates, and (3) the structure and resources of the ABA provide 
lawyer members of the committee the support and access 
necessary to identify and interview thoroughly those with relevant 
knowledge of judicial candidates.30  It has always been an implicit, 
and often an explicit, assumption that the committee members 
would “have varied professional experiences and backgrounds.”31  
 
 29.  See Little, supra note 3, at 59, 64–65; Laurence H. Silberman, The 
American Bar Association and Judicial Nominations, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1092, 1094 (1991).    
 30.   Little, supra note 3, at 45–46, 63; Smelcer et al., supra note 3, at 
827–28 (explaining that in the formative years of the committee it was 
viewed as having a special expertise necessary to evaluate judicial 
candidates).      
 31.   Standing Committee, supra note 4, at 1.  
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The official ABA document describing how the Standing 
Committee works includes that very statement.32  However, it is 
not true of the membership and leadership of the ABA generally, 
which has been well known for some time,33 and I have now 
shown that it is not true of the Standing Committee on the 
Federal Judiciary. 
 It is much harder—perhaps impossible—to justify the role of 
the Standing Committee when its members are drawn from such a 
small subset of the legal profession.  Lawyers who represent large 
corporations in litigation surely have a different perspective from 
those who, for example, represent individual plaintiffs in products 
liability actions or criminal defendants in drug prosecutions. This 
majority perspective is likely to overwhelm or mute any diversity 
among the committee members and influence the assessment of 
judicial candidates on criteria that are as subjective as “integrity,” 
“judicial temperament,” and “professional competence.”34 
Notwithstanding its public statements, the ABA has turned over 
the right to essentially veto federal judicial candidates to lawyers 
who make their living representing Fortune 1000 companies. 
These lawyers share another characteristic that raises serious 
concerns about the way the ABA is exercising its unique power: 
they work at law firms controlled overwhelmingly by white men.  
Only 16% of the equity partners and 4% of the managing partners 
at the two hundred largest law firms in the country are women. 
Twenty percent of the members of the management committees at 
 
 32.   Id; see Roberta Cooper Ramo & N. Lee Cooper, The American Bar 
Association's Integral Role in the Federal Judicial Selection Process:  
Excerpted Testimony Of Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee Cooper Before The 
Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate, May 21, 1996, 12 J. C.R.  & 
ECON. DEV. 93, 99 (1996) (explaining that “[t]he current Committee 
essentially reflects the diversity of the profession . . . The Committee 
members are drawn from firms of varying sizes, including solo 
practitioners.”).  
 33.  See Little, supra note 3, at 64–65.       
 34.  See Sen, supra note 4, at 36; Smelcer et al., supra note 3, at 828, 837.  
This is of course completely anecdotal, but I have a good friend most people 
would easily describe as a liberal Democrat.  He has spent his legal career 
defending corporations in employment discrimination cases.  “In twenty-five 
years,” he recently told me, “I have never seen a discrimination case with 
merit.”  I am quite confident that his professional role has something to do 
with this conclusion and would color his assessment of the fitness for judicial 
office of a plaintiffs’ employment lawyer.   
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those firms are women. In 11% there are no women on the 
management committee, and 35% of those firms have just one 
woman on their management committee.35 Similarly, within 
major law firms, minority representation declines the further up 
the organization one looks.  For example, in 2009, minorities 
accounted for  24% of summer associates, 19.7% of associates, and 
6% of partners.36 
Without casting aspersions, if Standing Committee members 
rate more highly lawyers with career paths similar to their own, 
women and minorities, who are less likely to have followed those 
paths, are likely to receive lower ratings. There is evidence of a 
Standing Committee bias against female and minority nominees.  
In a recent study, Maya Sen concluded that  even when controlling 
for qualifications, the ABA Standing Committee is more likely to 
rate female and minority candidates lower than their white and 
male peers. Specifically, black candidates for district court 
vacancies are 41% less likely to receive a high rating from the 
ABA than professionally identical whites nominated by the same 
president, and women are 18% less likely to receive a high rating 
than  men that are identically situated.37 
Finally, these downsides of  unrepresentative committees are 
not  offset by their  ability to identify  the best prospective 
nominees.  Studies have found at most a limited relationship 
between ABA ratings and future judicial performance as 
measured by reversals and citations, and the most recent study 
finds no relationship between a “Not Qualified” rating and judicial 
reversal.38  More generally, another recent study concludes that 
many of the widely accepted indicators of future judicial 
performance do not actually correlate with good performance, and 
 
 35.  Roberta D. Liebenberg, Has Women Lawyers’ Progress Stalled?, 
CHAMBERS WOMEN & DIVERSITY (May 29, 2013), http://womeninlaw. 
chambersandpartners.com/?p=2338. 
 36.  Elizabeth H. Gorman & Fiona M. Kay, Racial and Ethnic Minority 
Representation in Large U.S. Law Firms, 52 STUD. IN L. POL. & SOC’Y 211, 212 
(2010).  See generally Rachel M. Zahorsky, Women in Charge, 99 A.B.A. J., 
June 2013, at 34, 35.  
 37.  Sen, supra note 4, at 21-22.  
 38.  See Stephen Choi et al., How Well Do Measures of Judicial Ability 
Predict Judicial Performance?: A Case Study Using Securities Class Actions, 
33 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 37, 37 (2013); Sen, supra note 4, at 36.  
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some actually correlate with poor performance.39  Overall, the 
composition and work of the Standing Committee seems to 
warrant increased attention.  Either the system should be 
reformed or the ABA should be stripped of its special role.  A 
conversation should begin about which might be the best course of 
action. 
 
A modest start would be reconsideration of a reform proposal 
first made in 1996 by a commission on federal judicial 
appointments formed by the White Burkett Miller Center of 
Public Affairs at the University of Virginia (the “Commission”).  
The Commission was composed of present and former federal 
judges, former White House counsels to Republican and 
Democratic presidents, former Justice Department officials, two 
former U.S. senators, a practicing lawyer, and a law professor.40  
The Miller Commission urged the ABA to expand the size of the 
Standing Committee to include more than one representative from 
each circuit.41  The Commission’s proposal was intended to 
address the problem of delay in filling judicial vacancies; but it is 
also potentially responsive to my concerns about the lack of 
professional diversity on the Standing Committee and the 
overwhelming influence of the  Standing Committee member from 
a prospective nominee’s circuit who conducts the investigation and 
drafts the preliminary and final reports on that prospective 
nominee.42  If the ABA increased the size of the Standing 
Committee and made it a priority to see that lawyers who 
represent individuals as plaintiffs were as likely to become 
members as those who represent corporations as defendants, for 
 
 39.  Choi et al., supra note 38.    
 40.   The members were Nicholas deBelleville Katzenbach, Attorney 
General in the Johnson administration; Harold R. Tyler, Jr., a former federal 
judge and Deputy Attorney General in the Ford administration; former 
Senators Howard Baker and Birch Bayh; attorney Lovida H. Coleman, Jr., 
former White House counsels Lloyd N. Cutler and Fred F. Fielding; former 
federal Judges Leon Higginbotham and Frederick B. Lacey; United States 
District Judge Kimba M. Wood; and Professor Daniel J. Meador from the 
University of Virginia School of Law.  Miller Center Commission No. 7, 
Report of the Commission on the Selection of Federal Judges (1996) available 
at http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/comm_1996.pdf.    
 41.   Id. at 7.  
 42.   See Little, supra note 3, at 65.   
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example, the ABA’s special role would be easier to justify.  It 
might behoove the ABA to look outside its membership ranks for 
committee members by looking to organizations of lawyers that 
are underrepresented in the ABA, such as the American 
Association for Justice (an organization of plaintiff trial lawyers) 
and the National Bar Association (the nation’s oldest and largest 
association of predominantly African-American judges and 
lawyers), just as two examples. 
As a more immediate and even more modest solution, the 
ABA should be much more transparent about who serves on the 
Standing Committee, providing, in an easily accessible format, not 
just the names of the members but biographical information about 
their professional lives.  Currently, the ABA website displays a 
“roster” of the members of the current Standing Committee 
consisting simply of each member’s name, and city and state of 
residence—for example, “First Circuit, Paul E. Summit, Boston, 
MA.”43  The only way for an interested observer to find more 
information about a member is to conduct independent research. 
This lack of transparency is shocking given the committee’s power 
and the ease with which more valuable information can be made 
available via the Internet. Indeed, if the ABA leadership is 
comfortable with the status quo, it should be more than willing to 
provide enough information about the committee members to 
assure the public that they are representative of the profession as 
a whole.  Without more information, such as the information, 
which this study has provided, the conversation about whether the 
ABA is responsibly exercising its unique power cannot even 
meaningfully begin. 
CONCLUSION 
The ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary has 
largely escaped the watchful eye of those who observe and study 
 
 43.  See Federal Judiciary Committee Members, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION (last visited Nov. 17, 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/groups 
/committees/federal_judiciary/about_us/members.html. The entry for Mr. 
Summit does not mention, for example, that he is a partner at Sullivan & 
Worcester, a law firm of approximately 175 lawyers with, according to the 
firm’s web site, “one goal: to help businesses thrive in an ever-changing 
marketplace.” SULLIVAN & WORCESTER, http:// www.sandw.com/firm.html 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2013).  
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the process of federal judicial selection.  However, recent studies, 
including this one, show that a light needs to shine more brightly 
on the Standing Committee. For some time, lawyers who 
represent businesses in litigation have dominated the committee, 
and those lawyers cannot help but bring the professional 
perspective shaped by their careers to the process of rating 
prospective judicial nominees.  Without a dramatic change in the 
composition of the Committee’s membership, its unique influence 
on the federal judicial selection process is not justifiable. 
